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H I G H L I G H T S
 Shell has used scenarios to deepen its strategic thinking for 40 years.
 Shell scenarios cover a broader set of drivers than traditional energy outlooks.
 Shell's New Lens Scenarios were published in February 2013.
 They look at trends in the economy, politics and energy over the 21st century.
 Coordinated policies are essential to meeting the world's rising energy needs.
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a b s t r a c t
Shell has been using scenario planning for 40 years to help deepen its strategic thinking. Developing and
applying scenarios is part of an ongoing process in Shell that encourages decision-makers to explore the
features, uncertainties, and boundaries of the future landscape, and engage with alternative points
of view.
Shell scenarios go beyond conventional energy outlooks and consider long-term trends in economics,
energy supply and demand, geopolitical shifts and social change. They are based on plausible
assumptions and quantiﬁcation, and include the impact of different patterns of individual and collective
choices.
Shell′s latest scenario publication, the New Lens Scenarios, published in 2013, provides an in-depth
analysis of how economic, social and political forces might play out over the 21st century, as well as their
consequences for the global energy system and environment. Its ‘Mountains’ and ‘Oceans’ scenarios set
out two distinct paths the world might take in the decades ahead. They reinforce the urgency and
complexity of addressing the world's resource and environmental stresses, and highlight the need for
business, government and society to ﬁnd new ways to collaborate, fostering policies that promote the
development and use of cleaner energy, and improve energy efﬁciency.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
From blackouts around the globe to the boiling tensions in the
Middle East, recent events have thrown up many uncertainties
about how the world will meet its growing future energy needs.
While these dramatic events have grabbed the headlines, they
come on top of several relentless trends that have been shaping
our global energy future.
The worldwide ﬁnancial crisis ushered in an era of macro-
economic volatility and accelerated the shift in inﬂuence from
West to East. As wealth levels rise in the emerging economies,
hundreds of millions of people are emerging from poverty. And
the global population, which is growing by more than 200,000
people every day, is projected to reach over 9 billion by 20501.
That is like adding one more China and India to the world, with
basic needs for food, water, and energy that will have to be met.
At the same time, many countries are making the journey from
rural to urban societies. According to one projection, the world
will build the equivalent of one new city of 1.3 million people
every week for the next 40 years2.
The upshot of these trends? Surging energy demand and
growing environmental stress. If we continue to use energy in
the same ways we do today, global energy needs could triple in the
ﬁrst half of this century. At the same time, many scientists agree
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that CO2 emissions must be halved by mid-century if we are to
avoid dangerous changes to the global climate.
Of course, over the coming decades we will surely ﬁnd creative
ways to improve the energy efﬁciency of our cars, homes, and
factories. And technology will help us unlock additional sources of
energy. But those gains may still not be enough to keep up with
the pace of underlying demand growth.
Closing this gap in energy supply/demand will require a
dramatic ramp-up in energy production or a drastic moderation
in energy use—or, more likely, some mix of both. But just how this
might be achieved remains unclear, giving rise to a ‘zone of
uncertainty’3. This could turn out to be a zone of extraordinary
misery or extraordinary opportunity, depending on how the world
responds.
For over four decades, Shell has developed and applied scenar-
ios as part of its strategic thinking to help grapple with such
uncertainties. Most companies monitor changes in their business
environment, but Shell is one of the few that routinely employs
alternative outlooks as a core strategic tool. Given the long
lifetimes of investments in the energy industry, decisions made
today have consequences for decades. Long-term scenario con-
siderations are helpful in shaping those decisions.
The success of the scenarios is not just their ability to provide
strategic insights, but their approach to developing and sharing
these insights. They enable the company's decision-makers to
think about the possible wider and longer-reaching implications
of unfolding trends and potential discontinuities. They stretch and
clarify thinking, helping to improve the company's prospects, not
only through enriching the context for decision-making, but also
by developing a leadership cadre that is more sensitive to changes
in the external environment.
2. Scenarios in Shell
From the outset of the practice in the company, scenario
developers embraced intuition, uncertainty, and engagement.
They did not shy away from talking about what could be
considered ‘unimaginable’. Producing neither rigid predictions
nor wild fantasies, scenario building is a craft that holds real
commercial value for Shell.
“While we can't predict the future, science-based creative
thinking can give us some clues,”4 says, Dr. Angela Wilkinson,
from the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment at
Oxford University, who used to work in Shell’s scenario team
and has co-authored a book about the practice.
Shell's scenario analysis focuses on four main areas – econom-
ics, geopolitics and socio-cultural issues, energy, and the environ-
ment – to understand how consumers, governments, energy
producers, and regulators are likely to behave and respond to
change in the decades ahead.
Today's scenario builders also use complex econometric mod-
eling and sophisticated methodologies. The scenarios develop-
ment process includes a multitude of short-, medium-, and long-
term portraits of global energy developments; individual country
analyses; and consideration of major trends in areas like public
health and urbanisation. Scenarios can take a global view or focus
on speciﬁc issues in speciﬁc countries, such as the future
for the emerging democracies of Libya or Iraq. They often look
decades ahead, but can also have a shorter-term focus, such as the
current Eurozone ﬁnancial crisis.
The ultimate goal of scenarios for Shell is to encourage and
equip business decision-makers to consider the factors that shape
their choices right now. That is important for an industry investing
billion-dollar sums in infrastructure which can operate for dec-
ades. Today scenarios continue to inﬂuence thinking across the
company, from the Board and Executive Committee right across
the operating businesses.
Many important strategic decisions taken over the last four
decades have the ﬁngerprints of scenario activity on them. Of
course, all major choices involve multiple inputs from many
people, but scenarios have explicitly highlighted speciﬁc threats
and opportunities or, more frequently, implicitly informed the
fundamental mind-sets underpinning decisions.
Scenarios under discussion in 1973 ﬁrst established Shell's
reputation for using this academic approach to inform strategic
business planning. When the Yom Kippur War broke out in October
of that year, the West's support for Israel angered oil-rich Arab states,
triggering an oil embargo. Fuel shortages sparked a global recession
and a massive stock market crash. The world reeled. But Shell's
decision-makers were mentally prepared for the worst because they
had already imagined such a scenario. This helped the company
weather the volatility of the 1970s, bringing ﬁnancial gains running
into the billions of dollars thanks to the re-conﬁguration or sale of
reﬁneries and installations, or decisions not to replace them.
The Scenarios' contribution to Shell's strategic thinking helped the
company to anticipate, adapt, and respond to another oil shock in
1979, as well as to the decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet
Union in the 1980s. It also prepared the company for the rise of
environmental concerns linked to carbon dioxide in the 1990s and to
explore the dynamics of recession and recovery in the 2000s. In the
past two decades, scenarios also helped prepare the company for the
impact of technology, terrorism, and globalisation in a rapidly
changing world.
Long before the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989, scenarios
workshops had imagined potential new opportunities in new markets
opening up behind the old Iron Curtain—not only in the Soviet Union,
but also across eastern Europe. Shell not only opened reﬁneries in
Eastern Europe, it closed down or sold some in Western Europe.
In the 1990s, growing social and environmental stresses were
highlighted, helping Shell develop a constructive, pro-active atti-
tude to the threat of climate change.
In 2005, scenarios also raised the probability of a looming gap
between the world's surging demand for energy and global
supplies and reinforced the signiﬁcance of natural gas in the
company's energy mix.
A few years later they highlighted a mix of circumstances that
made sustainable biofuels appear to be an attractive business
opportunity. In 2011, Shell moved into the production of low-
carbon bio-ethanol from Brazilian sugar cane.
In Shell's 2011 Signals & Signposts publication, one of the key
factors raised was the impact of heightened political tension in the
developing world. In early 2011, the Arab Spring took the world by
surprise with popular revolts toppling rulers in Egypt and Tunisia
and sowing the seeds for reform throughout the Middle East.
While Shell's scenarios cannot of course, predict the exact dates
of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, they haved
highlighted conditions that would make the rebellions increas-
ingly likely: growing resentment, youthful populations with little
opportunity for employment, economic volatility, and rising
unemployment and inﬂation.
Shell has shared at least half a dozen far-reaching global
scenarios with the wider world since the 1990s, probing the
impact of profound developments like the fall of the Iron Curtain
and the war in Iraq, as well as the evolution of alternative energy
resources like biofuels, shale gas, and wind, solar, and other
renewable energy resources. In 2013, a summary of recent work
entitled New Lens Scenarios was published (www.shell.com/
scenarios) (Charts 1–4).
3 Shell Scenarios Team (2011). Signals & Signposts, page 10.
4 Shell Scenarios Team (2012). 40 Years of Shell Scenarios, page 11.
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3. Scenarios and executive decision-making
Drawing on the knowledge of a network of specialists – both
within and outside the company – is central to the process of build-
ing scenarios. But engaging the company's own decision-executives
throughout the development process is vital to scenarios' impact.
Scenarios provide quantiﬁed insights and a language for executives
to apply when grappling with increasingly unfamiliar and challenging
conditions. They aim to be thought-provoking yet plausible, high-
lighting matters already in the foreground and also, crucially, back-
ground developments that should be brought to the fore. Used
effectively, these alternative outlooks can help organisations address
difﬁcult issues that need to be explored collaboratively even though
there may be deeply divided opinions about them.
Such an approach also helps equip decision-makers with a
deeper awareness of the very different perspectives others may
have, the need to engage with these perspectives effectively, and
the signiﬁcance to their own future of the choices made by others.
In that sense, scenarios are deeply relational as they focus on
people and their behaviour, and not only on seemingly impersonal
economic, political, and social forces.
The scenario alchemy as we experience it in Shell is a combina-
tion of a strategic thinking process, a mode of analysis, a social
process of engagement and inﬂuence, and, at its most powerful, an
enabler of individual and group exploration and discovery.
At least one of the functions of scenario work is to bring people
together to explore areas in a way that may reveal ‘unknown
unknowns,’ in the words of former US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld. This exploration is not primarily intended to produce
attractive booklets or reports, nice though those can be. It is most
importantly about helping people take a journey that guides them
into better choices based on richer considerations of the world
around them.
This journey can be difﬁcult. As the philosopher Schopenhauer
pointed out, new truths are ﬁrst ignored or ridiculed, then
vehemently opposed, and then, ultimately, taken to be self
evident—so at different points speciﬁc scenarios may be consid-
ered irrelevant, foolish, irritating, or even unnecessary. Never-
theless, experience in Shell has deepened our belief of the value to
our company of taking this journey.
The journey is never simple or linear. Fresh insights are rarely
absorbed from a single reading of a report or from attending a
presentation—no matter how brilliant. Understanding this fact
helps to avoid the disappointing fate of scenario approaches that
are separate from the central strategic deliberations of an organi-
zation. While such deliberations are generally embedded in a
formal strategic process, much reﬂection and inﬂuence also occurs
through parallel channels. In Shell, scenario activity is intrinsically
bound up with ongoing assessment of economic, political, and
market signals, and the strategic conversations that take place
around these. Hundreds of conversations, often informal, with
decision-executives over many months prepare fertile ground for
the crystallization of insights into scenarios, and also shape the
understanding of how scenarios can be best shaped to be
impactful.
4. The energy outlook and the zone of uncertainty
As an energy company, developments affecting the energy
industry will always be a central concern of Shell scenarios. Shell's
energy modeling looks at over 80 individual countries, with
regions to cover the smaller countries, and fourteen different
sectors of energy demand within each country. Analysis suggests
that underlying global demand for energy by 2050 would triple
from its 2000 level if emerging economies follow historical
patterns of development and if there were no supply constraints.
Natural innovation and competition could spur improvements
in energy efﬁciency to help moderate underlying demand by about
20% over this time. Ordinary rates of supply growth – taking into
account technological, geological, competitive, ﬁnancial, and poli-
tical realities – could naturally boost energy production by about
50%. But this still leaves a gap between business-as-usual supply
and business-as-usual demand equal to approximately the size of
the whole industry in 2000.
This gap – this zone of uncertainty – will have to be bridged by
some combination of extraordinary demand moderation and
extraordinary production acceleration. So, we must ask: Is this a
zone of extraordinary opportunity or extraordinary misery? For
example, smart urban development, ﬁrm and far-reaching policies
and commercial and technological innovation can all result in
some moderation. But so can price-shocks, knee-jerk policies, and
frustrated economic aspirations.
Timescales are a key factor. Buildings, infrastructure, and power
stations last several decades. The stock of vehicles can last a couple
of decades. New energy technologies must be demonstrated at
commercial scale and require three decades of sustained double-
digit growth to build industrial capacity and grow sufﬁciently to
feature at even 1–2% of the energy system.
The policies and possibilities in place in the next ﬁve years will
shape investment for the next 10 years, which will largely shape
the global energy picture out to 2050. How fast will tensions rise?
How fast can we make the right choices, and how quickly can
positive developments happen?
In considering these questions, previously published Shell
scenario work has highlighted our entry into an era of volatility
and transition—economically, politically, socially, and within the
energy and environmental systems:
 Intensiﬁed economic cycles as the conditions have changed
that underpinned the period from the mid 1980s to mid 2000s
—referred to as ‘the great moderation’ in the advanced indus-
trial economies.
 Heightened political and social instability, stimulated in part by
economic volatility.
 Tensions in the international order, as multilateral institutions
struggle to adjust to shifts in economic power, and other
arrangements proliferate.
 Signiﬁcant demographic transitions involving ageing popula-
tions in some places, youth bulges in others, and relentless
Chart 1. Shell Scenarios Team (2011). Energy drivers and the zone of uncertainty,
Signals & Signposts, page 9 www.shell.com/scenarios.
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urbanisation in both fast-emerging and less-developed
economies.
 Surging energy demand driven by growing populations and
prosperity, with new energy supplies emerging while others
struggle to keep pace, and greenhouse gas emissions increas-
ing, particularly from growth in coal consumption.
 The deployment of technological advances enabling rapid
growth in resource plays such as shale gas and liquid rich shales
in, for example, North America, with ripples across the globe,
but uncertain prospects elsewhere. The technology for using
renewable resources, such as solar photovoltaic, also advances
with rapidly growing supply from a small but established base.
 Better deﬁned and signiﬁcantly challenged planetary ecological
boundaries, including pressures arising from the energy–
water–food ‘Stress Nexus’, as each component experiences
supply/demand tightness. Because of their linkages, these
resources feed off each other and accelerate the combined
growth in stress.
5. New lenses
Inevitably, given these developments, any plausible outlooks
will be messy and patchy. Nevertheless, Shell's latest scenarios,
published in 2013, include a number of new 'lenses' that help us
view familiar landscapes from fresh angles and clarify possible
futures.
5.1. The paradox lenses
Paradoxes embody tensions. Three paradoxes highlight key
features of the emerging landscape.
The Prosperity Paradox—Economic development raises living
standards, but also imposes environmental, resource, ﬁnancial,
political, and social stresses that can undermine the beneﬁts of
prosperity. Globalisation reduces income inequality between
nations while increasing inequalities within them.
The Leadership Paradox—Addressing global stresses requires
coordination among increasing numbers of constituencies, but
the more groups involved, the more vested interests block pro-
gress. Fresh forms of collaboration need to cut across familiar
national, public–private, and industry-sector boundaries, but there
are no strong models for such collaborations, and they are difﬁcult
to get off the ground as different parties remain focussed on their
individual responsibilities.
The Connectivity Paradox—Growing connectivity stimulates
creativity but also puts intellectual property at risk, threatening
creativity. Connectivity facilitates individual expression and
empowerment, but also encourages herd behaviour and ampliﬁes
swings in conﬁdence and demand.
5.2. Two archetypal pathway lenses
The tensions inherent in these paradoxes fuel an emerging
era of transitions. Through examining a range of historical trans-
formations and various models of transition, two archetypal
‘Pathway Lenses’ may help bring clarity and insights to current
circumstances.
For example, countries around the world face challenges to
their current economic models, political regimes, and social
arrangements. The US is dealing with a long term decline in
relative global power, economic recession, and a deadlocked
political system. China and the other large emerging economies,
which appeared resilient in 2008, are now grappling with a range
of uncertainties in their search for stability and continued growth.
Europe appears to be postponing the challenge of fundamental
reform, “kicking the can down the road.” Countries face divergent
paths. Will they respond to the challenges they face through
adaptation and reform, following a Room to Manoeuvre pathway?
Or will change be postponed and a Trapped Transition pathway
ensue, until there is either a fundamental reset or collapse?
6. New lens scenarios for the 21st century
Of course, not all countries or actors will follow one single
Trapped Transition or Room to Manoeuvre pathway. Nevertheless,
the pathway lenses highlight patterns recurring throughout the
broader panorama.
Of particular prominence is the crucial relationship between
those who are more or less privileged under current arrange-
ments, and the inﬂuence this will have on future developments. In
fast-emerging nations, a growing middle class will make increas-
ing demands on governance and welfare entitlements. In devel-
oped countries, we see globalisation ‘hollowing out’ the middle
class as average household incomes stagnate while the top tier
prospers. In global geopolitics, there are growing tensions
between established and emerging powers, within an increasingly
inadequate multilateral institutional structure.
Two vistas present themselves—high Mountains where the
beneﬁts of an elevated position are exercised and protected, and
wide Oceans with rising tides, strong currents, and a churning of
established perspectives for new ones. A detailed evaluation of
these scenarios has been published elsewhere (www.shell.com/
scenarios) and a summary of key features follows.
Mountains—an outlook in which current advantages and
inﬂuence lock-in further future inﬂuence, and concentrate
prevailing power, beneﬁting the already advantaged.
Latent opposition is minimised through a combination of ‘carrots
and sticks’. Supply-side investments are stimulated, and philan-
thropy ﬂourishes. But growing rigidities and a lack of structural
adjustment begin to moderate economic development and even
limit international trade. Some fast-emerging economies fall into
the middle-income trap, ratcheting up social and political stresses.
The moderation of economic growth takes some pressure off
energy demand, and this looser supply/demand boundary can be
pushed further if progress is made with supply-side energy
policies that unlock resources.
New shale and tight gas resources enjoy widespread success
and grow to form a new ‘gas backbone’ to the global energy
system. Major oil resource holders fear market loss, and some face
severe political/social stresses in periods of modest prices. Supply-
side incentives, the abundance of gas, and policies that encourage
smarter compact city development open the route to transport
electriﬁcation and enable hydrogen infrastructure to be developed
for storage and transport of energy from intermittent or remote
renewables. Oil prices remain elevated and volatile, but grow only
modestly, and global gas pricing emerges due to high levels of
liquidity and inter-regional transport.
Sluggish economic growth in the early period, the relative
displacement of coal growth by gas over the longer term, and the
incentivisation of carbon capture and storage (CCS), all contribute
to a moderation in greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, these
still remain consistent with a global average temperature rise in
excess of 2 1C aspirations over the longer term. By the end of the
century, however, there is the potential for net zero annual
emissions from the energy sector, and even net negative emissions
as the result of the contribution of CCS with a proportion of
biomass feedstock. This opens the longer-term prospect that the
cumulative build-up of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmo-
sphere may overshoot aspirations but could then be repaired.
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Oceans—an outlook in which there is greater accommodation
of competing interests and broader diffusion of inﬂuence.
At ﬁrst, economic pressures strain social cohesion, forcing
changes in economic and political structures. A refreshed philo-
sophical narrative of ‘accommodation’ or ‘social coherence’ arises,
consistent with reforms to welfare and other social structures.
Productivity is boosted, as is catch-up growth by developing
countries. An ethos of accommodation and compromise promotes
growing aspirations and rising conﬁdence, reinforcing pressures
for continuing reform and for further accommodation.
Globalisation strengthens, and the key emerging economies
move to more balanced growth. But over time, the ‘newly
advantaged’ eventually become more defensive, even reactionary,
when faced with new policy choices and the impact of rapidly
rising resource and social stresses further ahead.
With emerging economies continuing to surge and boost
energy demand, this tighter supply/demand boundary can be
pushed further if energy policies lag on the supply side – partly
due to newly empowered populist sentiment – and some resource
developments ultimately disappoint.
Shale and tight gas performance outside North America
disappoint as a result of lower resource development than
anticipated and policy delays, and growth in oil production
from some major resource holders is constrained in the
early period as leadership transitions take their toll. This is
a particularly high oil-price world which economically
unlocks new high-cost resources and technological opportu-
nities and invokes a ‘long liquid fuels game’. Global gas
volume growth is steady but more modest than anticipated,
and prices remain regionalized but strong where there is
relative scarcity.
As a result of strong growth in coal consumption and the
extension of the oil age, resource stresses become severe, and
prices plus crises eventually stimulate strong demand-side
investment to increase end-user efﬁciency. Stimulated by higher
energy prices, renewable energy also grows, and by the 2060s
solar becomes the world's largest primary energy source. Never-
theless, greenhouse gas emissions follow a pathway towards a
high degree of climate change, ocean acidiﬁcation, and the need
for signiﬁcant adaptation. As the impact of delays in responding
to resource stresses becomes apparent, there are eventually
late and urgent moves to deploy CCS at scale. In combination
with the growth in solar energy and biofuels, this enables net zero
CO2 emissions from energy to be approached by the end of the
century.
Chart 2. Shell Scenarios Team (2013). New lens scenarios, ‘Mountains’ scenario total primary energy by source, page 34.
Chart 3. ‘Oceans’ scenario total primary energy by source, Shell New Lens Scenarios (Shell ScenariosTeam, 2013), page 59.
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7. Reﬂections
Each of these scenarios has different political, economic and
social trajectories, with different central patterns and counter-
currents. Interestingly, overall energy consumption is relatively
similar, although there are signiﬁcant differences in the mix of
resources, the price trajectories, sector-level speciﬁcs, and levels of
resource stress. Total global energy consumption by 2050 is some
80% higher than today, with the underlying upward pressure on
demand due to stronger economic growth in Oceans offset to a
large extent by higher prices.
Both scenarios exhibit extraordinary moderation of demand
growth and extraordinary acceleration of supply—both of which,
as was previously noted, would be necessary to bridge the zone of
uncertainty. In Mountains, demand moderation occurs through
economic sluggishness and the development of efﬁcient infra-
structures such as compact cities, whereas in Oceans the main
moderators are high prices and end-user efﬁciencies. On the
energy production side, the main contribution to acceleration in
Mountains is the global extension of North America's ongoing
shale and tight gas revolution, while in Oceans this occurs through
growth in enhanced oil recovery, biofuels, and other frontier
developments, as well as solar eventually growing to become the
single largest primary energy source.
In fact, both scenarios witness a shift in the largest global
primary energy source in the decades ahead. In Mountains, natural
gas becomes the largest source in the 2030s, ending a 70-year
reign for oil. Before that, coal's reign as the number one global
energy source had lasted around 50 years (circa 1910 to 1960),
taking over from traditional sources of biomass like wood, peat,
dung, and agricultural waste. In Oceans, solar becomes the largest
source by the 2070s.
8. Concluding remarks
Shell's New Lens Scenarios suggest that addressing the chal-
lenges of the 21st century will be difﬁcult and often uncomfor-
table. It may require many people and organisations to reconsider
their own vested interests, to forge innovative partnerships, and to
move towards more effectively accommodating the interests of
others as a necessary component of their own ﬂourishing.
The scenario approach encourages decision-makers to explore
the features, uncertainties, and boundaries of the future landscape,
and engage with alternative points of view. For example, it is
becoming clearer that a prosperous and sustainable global outlook
must encompass both energy-efﬁcient infrastructures like com-
pact cities as well as efﬁcient end-use in vehicles and buildings.
Similarly, a prosperous and sustainable outlook requires both
cleaner fossil fuels and also a revolution in renewable energy as
well. A ‘both/and’ rather than an ‘either/or’ attitude is required in
policy making.
Although, of course, there needs to be a sensible understanding
of the pros and cons of both clean and green approaches, the true
battle is against time. Every year that passes sees, for example,
strong growth in coal burning and the ratcheting upwards of
cumulative greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The
pace at which CCS technology is deployed at scale and at which
natural gas substitutes for coal growth is the main driver of
difference between cumulative emissions in the Mountains and
Oceans scenarios. If it were possible to accelerate these develop-
ments even more than described in the Mountains scenario, the
cumulative emissions for the 21st century would be closer to a level
consistent with containing global average temperature rise to 2 1C.
The scenarios highlight many opportunities, but they also
underline the complexity and urgency of resource stresses. Tech-
nology deployment is important, but political and societal choices
are as inﬂuential as resources and technology.
Both Mountains and Oceans scenarios have positive and
troubling features. Achieving a greater balance of positive features
in the future depends on the capacity of business, government,
and civil society to work more effectively together. Beyond its
value within individual organisations, scenarios can play a con-
structive role in supporting cross-sector dialogue and
collaboration. The challenge will be to see if it is somehow possible
to deliver the best of both worlds from both scenarios.
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